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Penilaianaset tertentu untuk penilaian risiko keselamatan maklumat perlu mengambil
kira kewujudan sumber yang mencukupi dan pulangan ke atas pelaburan (ROI). Wa-
laupun rangka kerja penilaian risiko yang baik diperlukan, kebanyakan rangka kerja
yang sedia ada tidak mempunyai garis panduan terperinci dan kebanyakannya ber-
gantung kepada kaedah kualitatif. Oleh itu, ia memerlukan tambahan masa dan kos
untuk menguji semua kawalan keselamatan maklumat. Kebersandaran kepada input
dan maklum balas manusia akan meningkatkan penentuan subjektif dalam organisa-
si. Matlamat utama tesis ini adalah untuk mereka bentuk model Keutamaan Kawalan
Keselamatan Maklumat (ISCP) yang efektif bagi memperbaiki proses penilaian risi-
ko. Kajian kes berdasarkan ujian penembusan dan penilaian kerentanan telah dilak-
sanakan untuk mengumpul data. Kemudian, Teknik untuk Susunan Prestasi dengan
Keserupaan kepada Penyelesaian Ideal (TOPSIS) telah digunakan untuk menentukan
keutamaan data. Gabungan analisis kepekaan dan temuduga pakar telah digunakan
untuk menguji dan mengesahkan model ini. Seterusnya, prestasi model tersebut te-
lah dinilai oleh pakar keselamatan. Hasil penyelidikan ini menunjukkan model ISCP
telah meningkatkan kualiti penilaian kawalan keselamatan maklumat dalam organi-
sasi. Model ini memainkan peranan penting untuk menentukan keutamaan kawalan
keselamatan teknikal yang kritikal semasa proses penilaian risiko. Tambahan pula,
output model ini menyokong perlaburan keselamatan dengan mengenal pasti kawalan
yang sesuai untuk mengurangkan risiko ke tahap yang boleh diterima dalam organisa-
si. Sumbangan utama kajian ini adalah pembangunan satu model yang mengurangkan
ketidak-tentuan, kos dan masa penilaian kawalan keselamatan maklumat. Panduan
yang praktikal dan jelas akan membantu organisasi untuk menentukan keutamaan ka-
walan penting dengan lebih cekap dan dipercayai. Semua sumbangan ini akan memi-
nimakan pembaziran sumber dan memaksimakan keselamatan organisasi.
Kata kunci: Penilaian risiko keselamatan maklumat, pengurusan risiko, proses peni-
laian, keutamaan kawalan keselamatan.
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Abstract
Evaluating particular assets for information security risk assessment should take
into consideration the availability of adequate resources and return on investments
(ROI). Despite the need for a good risk assessment framework, many of the existing
frameworks lack of granularity guidelines and mostly depend on qualitative meth-
ods. Hence, they require additional time and cost to test all the information security
controls. Further, the reliance on human inputs and feedback will increase subjec-
tive judgment in organizations. The main goal of this research is to design an efficient
Information Security Control Prioritization (ISCP) model in improving the risk assess-
ment process. Case studies based on penetration tests and vulnerability assessments
were performed to gather data. Then, Technique for Order Performance by Similarity
to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) was used to prioritize them. A combination of sensitivity
analysis and expert interviews were used to test and validate the model. Subsequently,
the performance of the model was evaluated by the risk assessment experts. The results
demonstrate that ISCP model improved the quality of information security control as-
sessment in the organization. The model plays a significant role in prioritizing the
critical security technical controls during the risk assessment process. Furthermore,
the model’s output supports ROI by identifying the appropriate controls to mitigate
risks to an acceptable level in the organizations. The major contribution of this re-
search is the development of a model which minimizes the uncertainty, cost and time
of the information security control assessment. Thus, the clear practical guidelines
will help organizations to prioritize important controls reliably and more efficiently.
All these contributions will minimize resource utilization and maximize the organiza-
tion’s information security.
Keywords: Information security risk assessment, risk management, assessment pro-
cess, security control prioritization.
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The main aim of an information system for businesses is to enhance their operation
and to facilitate decision making. This electronic dependency has improved business
operations and opportunities [13, 14]. Information Security Risk Management (ISRM)
is playing a critical role not only in exploring and assessing information security risks
to business operations, but also in determining the appropriate controls. This research
presents an Information Security Control Prioritization (ISCP) model which improves
the control assessment process in ISRM. This chapter is an overall introduction to
the thesis, initially outlining the Information Security Risk Assessment (ISRA) frame-
work and its steps. It then establishes the strategy, direction, motivation, importance
and contributions of the research. Section 1.1 gives a brief background of the research
focus and general goal. The research motivation is described in Section 1.2, followed
by discussion of the research problem, research questions and research objectives in
Sections 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 respectively. The scope and flow of the research are described in
Sections 1.6 and 1.7 respectively. The last two Sections discuss the research contribu-
tions and organization of the thesis.
1.1 Information Security Risk Assessment Frameworks
The Internet has become the main resource for information searching around the globe;
however, it presents many challenges and raises many issues to organizations in man-
aging their assets. Organizations depend on information that is accessed over the net-
works and is stored in digital formats, making it their most valuable asset [2, 15].
Hence, security and protection of information assets are becoming of utmost impor-
tance for organizations and businesses. Lack of security opens organizational assets,
particularly sensitive information and critical systems, to a variety of risks such as loss,
1
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